

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

A U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

by

Colonel Michael D. Lingenfelter
United States Army

Colonel Timothy Gann
Project Advisor

This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree. The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

Report Documentation Page

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

1. REPORT DATE 03 MAY 2004	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED -		
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE The U.S. National Security Strategy for the 21st Century		5a. CONTRACT NUMBER		
		5b. GRANT NUMBER		
		5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER		
6. AUTHOR(S) Michael Lingenfelter		5d. PROJECT NUMBER		
		5e. TASK NUMBER		
		5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER		
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, PA, 17013-5050		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER		
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)		
		11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)		
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited				
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
14. ABSTRACT See attached file.				
15. SUBJECT TERMS				
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:		17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES 27	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT unclassified	b. ABSTRACT unclassified			

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: COL Michael D. Lingenfelter
TITLE: A U.S. National Security Strategy for the 21st Century
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 19 March 2004 PAGES: 27 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The current National Security Strategy represents a major change from the previous post-Cold War strategies. While numerous factors can account for this change, clearly the impact of terrorism on U.S. shores is largely responsible for the shift in America's strategy. This paper will first discuss the environment that drove the Bush Administration to dramatically alter the direction of the nation's grand strategy. Secondly, this paper will argue that the effects of globalization require a balanced use of all elements of national power to successfully achieve U.S. strategic goals.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
A U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY	1
EVOLUTION OF U.S. GRAND STRATEGY.....	1
THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT OF THE 21ST CENTURY.....	2
THE THREAT	2
THE NEW ERA OF GLOBALIZATION	3
THE CATALYST OF CHANGE.....	5
THE BUSH DOCTRINE.....	6
ANALYSIS OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY.....	7
IS THERE A ROLE FOR PREEMPTION?	8
U.S. MILITARY SUPREMACY.....	9
UNILATERALISM VERSUS MULTILATERALISM.....	9
DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS	10
A GRAND STRATEGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY.....	10
THE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION	11
CONCLUSION	14
ENDNOTES	15
BIBLIOGRAPHY	19

A U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

EVOLUTION OF U.S. GRAND STRATEGY

Historically, significant global events have resulted in periods of both revolutionary and evolutionary change in U.S. grand strategy. Unique shifts in the direction of U.S. security strategy have occurred in response to both domestic priorities and international events. World War II resulted in the bifurcated world that dominated U.S. grand strategy for the nearly fifty years of the Cold War. The decades of the Cold War were marked by the U.S. pursuing a strategy of containment while, at the same time, competing to maintain at least a balance of power with the Soviet Union. The most notable example of U.S. strategy during this period is contained in Paul Nitze's National Security Council Document 68 (NSC-68) report to President Truman.¹ NSC-68, published in 1950, described a massive communist threat with the goal of global domination and that this threat could only be countered by a U.S. military build-up and policy of containment.²

Although few questioned the direction of U.S. grand strategy in the 20th century, in 1986 Congress formalized a requirement for the Executive Branch to codify the nation's security strategy with the passage of The Goldwater-Nichols National Defense Reorganization Act. The law requires the President to annually submit to Congress a document detailing his National Security Strategy. While the primary focus of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation was to reorganize the Department of Defense, Congress clearly wanted the Executive Branch to articulate its grand strategy on a regular basis. There are several explanations, many cynical, as to why Congress thought it was important for the Executive Branch to provide a written report stipulating the nation's security strategy. Simply stated, Congress wanted the President to specify the mid- and long-term strategy to defend and promote national interests using all of the elements of national power. In a more practical sense, Congress could better allocate resources to achieve the nation's strategic aims if it had a clear picture of the ends, ways and means of the security policy.³

Since 1986 the Executive Branch has submitted, albeit somewhat sporadically, ten National Security Strategy reports to Congress. According to Keir and Robert Lieber writing for the *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda*, the documents have often consisted of "lofty rhetoric or uncontroversial restatements of official policy."⁴ Even though the Reagan Administration produced National Security Decision Directive 75 (NSDD 75), entitled "U.S. Relations with the USSR," its National Security Strategy reports to Congress sustained the tradition of NSC 68 by calling for containment of the Soviet Union while continuing to enhance military capabilities.⁵

In the late 1980s and early 1990s world events necessitated a change in U.S. grand strategy. The end of the Cold War provided the conditions for a shift in U.S. security policy. The first Bush Administration, having to cope with the uncertainty and complexity of the “new world order,” produced a strategy calling for “collective engagement.” The Bush strategy, although marginally different from its predecessors, maintained containment of the newly defined threats as the principle attribute of U.S. security strategy. Similarly, the Clinton Administration, with a primary focus on domestic issues, articulated a strategy of “engagement and enlargement” as a common theme in all four of its reports to Congress. Nonetheless, the Clinton Administration still used containment and deterrence as the foundation for its strategies.⁶

Each of the aforementioned strategies achieved some degree of success in their implementation. The collapse of the Soviet Union, Democratization of Eastern Europe, victory in Desert Storm, NATO expansion, passing of the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and a tenuous peace in the Balkans, to name a few, demonstrate that each Administration’s strategy accomplished a great deal in the latter part of the 20th century. Unfortunately, these victories did not lead to a less volatile security environment for the new millennium. To the contrary, the challenge of protecting and furthering U.S. national security interests has become more complex than ever before.

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT OF THE 21ST CENTURY

The nature of the threat to U.S. interests and the impact of globalization are the greatest factors requiring a change in U.S. grand strategy in the 21st century. A fundamental understanding of the threat and the global environment in which the threat operates is a prerequisite to developing an effective security policy. Although some of the nation’s grand strategy continues on an evolutionary path, the events of September 11, 2001 (9-11) have provided the catalyst for a revolutionary change in much of the U.S. security strategy.

THE THREAT

The end of the Cold War, although greeted with euphoria throughout most of the world, did not prove to be the panacea to end conflict as many had hoped. To the contrary, in the last decade of the 20th and the early years of the 21st century new security challenges emerged that eclipsed the complexity of the Cold War threats by comparison. The bi-polar world of the Cold War gave way to increased transnational actors, violent ethnic struggles, newly empowered rogue nations and individuals, and an escalation of the ubiquitous specter of terrorism. Arguably, the U.S. is less secure now than at anytime during the Cold War.

In the 21st century, super empowered individuals, terrorist organizations and rogue nations possess the capability to produce devastating effects. Although the U.S. currently has no peer competitor in terms of conventional military strength, its enemies are determined, adaptive and emboldened to action. Furthermore, these forces do not necessarily share allegiance to any one nation, making it more difficult to identify, locate and punish would be attackers. They are more likely to be loyal to a depraved ideology, i.e., radical fundamentalist Islam, which is globally networked by the powers of the information age. Compounding the significance of this new threat is the enemy's use of asymmetric tactics coupled with the proliferation and miniaturization of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The combination of terrorism, rogue states and WMD creates a unique threat to U.S. security. President Bush characterized this threat while speaking at West Point in June of 2002 and later documented in the National Security Strategy.

The gravest danger to freedom lies at the perilous crossroads of radicalism and technology. When the spread of chemical and biological and nuclear weapons, along with ballistic missile technology -- when that occurs, even weak states and small groups could attain a catastrophic power to strike great nations. Our enemies have declared this very intention, and have been caught seeking these terrible weapons.⁷

The new threat uses both old and new tactics in its efforts to produce strategic effects. During the Cold War, the U.S. prepared to face a conventional enemy who openly massed combat formations on the battlefield. Today, the adversaries of the U.S. have deviated from the established norms of conflict and are seeking to counter the superior capabilities of American power with unconventional, asymmetric means.⁸ Improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers, and aircraft used as missiles are a few of the now familiar means that frequent the headlines in today's news. Opponents of the U.S. and its allies increasingly recognize that they cannot successfully engage in traditional combat operations. As a result, terrorist organizations and rogue nations have adapted to using asymmetric means to achieve their political goals. When empowered with WMD, the potential ruthlessness of this new type of enemy has no bounds.

THE NEW ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

In a sense, the world has become smaller and the role of traditional nation-states has been reduced. The phenomenon of globalization, although not new but propelled by technology, has enabled those who previously lacked the means to affect powerful nations to become players in the global system. Richard N. Haass, Director of the Department of State's Policy Planning Staff, defines globalization as the totality and velocity of connections and

interactions -- be they economic, political, social, cultural -- that are sometimes beyond the control or even knowledge of governments and other authorities.⁹ Haass goes on to say that "globalization is characterized by the compression of distance and the increasing permeability of traditional boundaries to the rapid flow of goods, services, people, information, and ideas. It is a multifaceted, transnational phenomenon."¹⁰

Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the United Nations, provides a more concise definition of globalization. Annan, writing for the *International Herald Tribune*, states that "globalization is commonly understood to describe the increasing flow of goods, services, capital, technology, information, ideas and labor at the global level, driven by liberalization policies and technological change."¹¹ He sees globalization as a "truly integrating and inclusive force"¹² for the overall good of mankind, but recognizes there is risk associated with globalization as well. Annan warns that "the gap between haves and have-nots . . . in a globalized world where no border is impermeable and where the privileges of the few are painfully apparent to those multitudes who yearn for liberty and opportunity."¹³

Joseph S. Nye, writing for *Foreign Affairs*, accurately asserts that "the information revolution and technological change have elevated the importance of transnational issues and have empowered non-state actors to play a larger role in world politics."¹⁴ In the current era, nations can no longer rely upon geographic insularity to provide them a certain level of security as they have in the past. Commenting on the effect of globalization on the U.S., Nye asserts that globalization "has been wearing away at the natural buffers that distance and two oceans have always provided."¹⁵

Thomas Friedman, in his highly acclaimed book *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, argues that the era of globalization has replaced the Cold War era. His view is that the Cold War was in itself an international system and that globalization has now become the new international system. According to Friedman, the over arching feature of the Cold War era was division but now, in the globalized world, the key feature is integration. The technology of the information age enables individuals, markets, nation-states, corporations, etc., to be fully integrated within the system. Friedman's argument is compelling in that it recognizes the role of organizations that operate outside of the traditional control of any one government.¹⁶

The current era of globalization makes achieving U.S. strategic ends more complex than ever before. Transnational actors, ranging from terrorist organizations to drug cartels, not only operate outside of the traditional control of nation-states, but have access to substantial funds and advanced technologies. These newly empowered threats are often geographically dispersed but linked via the technology of the information age.

Similarly, the actions of international bodies such as the North Atlantic Council, United Nations, European Union, and many others have gained increased legitimacy and power. Additionally, a myriad of non-governmental organizations have risen in stature and influence. These transnational organizations have parochial interests that may or may not be fully congruent with U.S. national security interests. Nonetheless, these groups add to the complexity and further integration of the world in the globalized era.

THE CATALYST OF CHANGE

In the last part of the 20th and early years of the 21st century, ideologically based terrorist activity escalated, but Americans remained content to keep these new security challenges at arms length. Domestic concerns, particularly economic growth, dominated the political discourse in the U.S. After all, the U.S. had won a great victory in Desert Storm and had no peer in terms of overall military capability. As a result, containment and deterrence remained the principle attributes of U.S. grand strategy. Rogue nations, most notably Iraq, Iran and North Korea, were kept in check within their borders. Similarly, the “war on drugs” seemed to have reached an uneasy equilibrium that most Americans could tolerate.

It is also clear that terrorists targeted America and American interests long before September 11th, 2001. The bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon in 1983; hijacking of the Achille Lauro in 1985; bombing of Pan Am 103 in 1988; Khobar Towers bombing in 1996; attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998; and bombing of the USS Cole in 2000 -- were all distant from American shores and, in each case, U.S. outrage was relatively short-lived.¹⁷ Even the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 did not raise the ire of the American populace enough to demand an immediate retaliatory response. Perhaps the fact that only six died, although scores were injured, and the quick capture of those directly responsible, placated U.S. public outrage.

On September 11, 2001 America's acceptance of the status quo was irreversibly shattered. The sheer magnitude of the destruction, both symbolically and in terms of human loss, affected Americans at least as much as any previous incident in U.S. history. As a result of the tragic events of 9-11, America and much of the international community came to the realization that the new millennium would be a far more dangerous and uncertain place than that of the previous era.

THE BUSH DOCTRINE

We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.

—President George W. Bush

The current *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* represents a major change from the previous post-Cold War strategies. While numerous factors can account for this change, clearly the impact of terrorism on U.S. shores is largely responsible for the shift in America's grand strategy. In accordance with national law and approximately one year after the 9-11 attacks, the Bush Administration released its first National Security Strategy. The document breaks out of the post-Cold War paradigm by recognizing that threats to the U.S. could no longer be held at a comfortable distance through a policy of containment and deterrence.

In response and recognition of the new environment, President Bush correctly chartered a new and aggressive course in U.S. security strategy. While speaking at the National Cathedral in Washington, D.C. only three days after the 9-11 attacks, President Bush demonstrated his resolve to pursue the attackers and those that supported them. "But our responsibility to history is already clear: to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil. War has been waged against us by stealth and deceit and murder. This nation is peaceful, but fierce when stirred to anger. The conflict was begun on the timing and terms of others. It will end in a way, and at an hour, of our choosing."¹⁸ Within a few short months following the president's comments, the U.S. had defeated the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and seemingly had the al-Qaida terrorists on the run.

The strategy accurately recognizes that the security environment of the 21st century is more complex and dangerous than the previous era. It emphasizes the emergence of rogue states and the asymmetric nature of terrorism as the most urgent threat to the United States.¹⁹ The strategy frequently, and accurately, paints a clear picture of the threat as it argues for a new approach to national security.

There are four key tenets of the Bush doctrine contained in the National Security Strategy.²⁰ First, and the most controversial, the strategy calls for the preemptive use of force against hostile nations and terrorist organizations attempting to develop WMD. Second, the National Security Strategy declares that the U.S. will maintain a military capability that is superior to any other nation. Third, the strategy expresses the desire of the Administration to work multilaterally in the spirit of cooperation with the international community, but "will not

hesitate to act alone, if necessary”²¹ to protect U.S. national interests and security. Finally, the document states the goal of spreading democracy and human rights around the globe, particularly in the Muslim world.²²

ANALYSIS OF THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION’S NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

Whereas previous strategies were largely defensive, the new strategy is overtly offensive in nature. John Lewis Gaddis, noted historian and author, characterized Bush’s strategy as “the most sweeping shift in U.S. grand strategy since the beginning of the Cold War.”²³ Gaddis also correctly identified the Administration’s key dilemma by stating that the strategy’s “success depends on the willingness of the rest of the world to welcome U.S. power with open arms.”²⁴

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has enjoyed the prestige and influence as the world’s only superpower. However, the U.S. must simultaneously be prepared to bear the burdens associated with its position of leadership in the world. U.S. actions in Afghanistan, Iraq and other places under the rubric of the Global War on Terrorism have received mixed reviews, but in each case, and consistent with its grand strategy, the Bush Administration has demonstrated the resolve to take action.

The tone of the current National Security Strategy clearly leans toward U.S. primacy underpinned by military strength. The majority of the document deals with the use of military power, homeland security, and intelligence. The less coercive elements of national power are far less prominent.²⁵ Critics of the strategy, such as Barry R. Posen, characterize the Bush strategy as, “in caricature, unilateral, nationalistic, and oriented largely around the U.S. advantage in physical power, especially military power.”²⁶ Posen goes on to say that the strategy does mention alliances, cooperation, economic and political development, and liberal values but that the traditional European allies are hardly mentioned. “Even allowing for the need for stern language to mobilize public support for the war on terror, the document has a martial tone -- and is strongly committed to a wide variety of proactive uses of force.”²⁷

The Bush doctrine of fighting wars of prevention, as some have characterized it, has been the source of strong criticism from many in the international community and within the U.S. Although previous strategies have recognized the threats of transnational actors, rogue nations, criminal alliances and terrorism, President Bush’s strategy departs from those of his predecessors by calling for preemptive action to eliminate these threats. The policy of preemption, although not entirely new to U.S. policy or international precedent, marks a clear difference from the traditional Cold War strategy that emphasized a defensive posture of containment and deterrence. Some argue, most notably Charles Knight, that the strategy goes

so far as to normalize war as the means to achieving national goals.²⁸ Moreover, the Bush strategy affirms the Administration's desire to work with allies and friends to combat the threat, but further states that the U.S. will act alone, if necessary, to defend its vital interests.²⁹

IS THERE A ROLE FOR PREEMPTION?

Preemption is not new to U.S. grand strategy but the U.S. has largely refrained from actually exercising anticipatory self-defense.³⁰ The examples of the U.S. exercising its right of preemption are few but noteworthy, ranging from the attack of a Spanish Fleet in the Philippines prior to the Spanish-American War in 1898 to the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983. The preemptive use of force during the Cold War was narrowly averted during the Cuban Missile Crisis, although some argue that the quarantine of Cuba was a preemptive act. Furthermore, NSC-68 explicitly accepted and justified the idea of a preemptive nuclear strike if a Soviet attack was imminent.³¹

There exists a legitimate debate between preemption and preventive war, albeit many use the terms interchangeably. The Department of Defense defines preemption as, "an attack initiated on the basis of incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent."³² The dictionary defines preventive war as, "a war initiated in the belief that military conflict, while not imminent, is inevitable, and that to delay would involve greater risk."³³ The distinction between preemption and prevention is significant to many both internationally and domestically.

Preemption has a basis in international law and, therefore has a high degree of legitimacy in the eyes of many. Preventive wars do not share the same legitimacy because "the threat is neither certain nor imminent."³⁴ The fear of many is that the U.S. will use its doctrine of preemption as a subterfuge for the use of military force as a first choice and potentially outside of the norms of international law. Compounding this fear is the strategy's overt declaration that the best "defense is a good offense."³⁵ The dilemma that this doctrine presents is that many nations feel that they must resist U.S. actions diplomatically to keep American use of force in check. Ultimately, preemption may undercut U.S. preferences for building multilateral coalitions to combat global threats.

Analysis of current events in Iraq demonstrates the risk the U.S. assumes by acting with limited international support. Acting alone or without the assistance of traditional allies should only be done in extreme circumstances. The evidence to support preemptive action must be compelling and the danger imminent before the U.S. should act unilaterally. Despite America's status as the world's only superpower, alienating the international community can only jeopardize the ultimate success of a campaign. Obviously, before taking offensive action, the

U.S. should always assess the risks, to include the second and third order effects. As many have observed, the Bush Administration's decision to act against Saddam Hussein without wider international support may have been, at best, premature. In doing so, the U.S. lost some momentum in its Global War on Terrorism. Ultimately, actions in Iraq may lead to long-term strategic failure. Nonetheless, Operation Iraqi Freedom will serve as an important lesson for the Bush presidency, as well as future Administrations.

U.S. MILITARY SUPREMACY

The second element of the Bush doctrine calls for a U.S. military capability that is superior to any other nation. The strategy states, "We must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge."³⁶ Coupled with the policy of preemption, this explicit statement of military supremacy is significant. The strategy establishes the U.S. goal of maintaining primacy underpinned by military strength. Again, the U.S. is not well served by such overt statements. It is no secret that the U.S. spends more on defense than most of the world combined. For example, the U.S. defense budget, at around \$440 billion, eclipses by nearly three times the combined defense spending of its NATO allies.³⁷ There exists great potential that other world powers, e.g., China or Russia, may seek to engage in an arms race to challenge U.S. military primacy. Even though this is unlikely, certain nations may seek niche technologies and capabilities that can, at least on the margins, challenge America's overwhelming military strength. Furthermore, the exportation of these technologies to rogue nations or terrorist organizations counters the very goal that the strategy attempts to achieve.

UNILATERALISM VERSUS MULTILATERALISM

The third element of the Bush doctrine states the desire of the U.S. to work multilaterally with other nations, but that the U.S. "will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary."³⁸ Reserving the right to act unilaterally is inherent to the sovereignty of any nation-state when confronted with an imminent threat and is fully justified. It goes without saying that the U.S., as a superpower, has the strength to act alone. What makes many uncomfortable with unilateralism as stated in the National Security Strategy is that it is another expression of an over reliance on military power to achieve national interests. The statement seemingly discounts the judgment of international bodies if they are at odds with the U.S. This policy may work against the U.S. by encouraging some nations and organizations to work toward keeping U.S. power in check. Furthermore, in the new era of globalization, acting alone increases the potential for unintended second and third order effects. This is particularly true when the U.S. disagrees with other powerful nations as was the case with France, Germany, Russia and China with respect to actions in Iraq.

DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Finally, the doctrine expresses the goal of spreading democracy and human rights around the globe, particularly in the Muslim world.³⁹ This lofty goal is noble but potentially the hardest to achieve. Although consistent with American values and traditionally a part of U.S. grand strategy, the current strategic environment makes this goal particularly challenging. The National Security Strategy calls for a “distinctly American internationalism.”⁴⁰ The problem with this statement is that much of the world does not, and probably could never share the same interests and values as the U.S. If for no other reason, cultural and political diversity makes widespread democratization problematic.

Many nations and transnational actors envy the U.S., while others either covertly or overtly loathe America. This is particularly true in the Middle East, the first battleground in the Global War on Terrorism. The challenge of promoting human rights and democracy in the Muslim world, while defeating terrorism, will be extremely difficult. Fouad Ajami, writing for *Foreign Affairs*, clearly articulates the challenge the U.S. faces.

The war will not be easy for America in those lands. The setting will test it in ways it has not been tested before. There will be regimes asking for indulgence for their own terrible fights against Islamists and for logistical support. There will be rulers offering the bait of secrets that their security services have accumulated through means at odds with American norms. Conversely, friends and sympathizers of terror will pass themselves off as constitutionalists and men and women of the ‘civil society.’ They will find shelter behind pluralist norms while aiding and abetting the forces of terror. There will be chameleons good at posing as America’s friends but never turning up when needed. There will be one way of speaking to Americans, and another of letting one’s population know that words are merely a pretense.⁴¹

A GRAND STRATEGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

The Bush Administration has broken new ground in U.S. grand strategy by recognizing the strategic environment of the 21st century and developing policies to counter the non-traditional threats to America. Like NSC-68, the Bush National Security Strategy, despite its many critics, will serve as the foundation from which future strategies will evolve to face the challenges of the new millennium. However, the next National Security Strategy should be adjusted to fully account for the impact of globalization and properly balance all elements of national power.

First and foremost, the U.S. must not only recognize but embrace the phenomenon of globalization in the crafting of its future National Security Strategies. Globalization is a fundamental reality of the new millennium and includes almost all aspects of security strategy.

Richard Kugler, Professor and Director of the Center for Technology and National Policy at the National Defense University, recognizes globalization as a “factual trend”⁴² that encompasses “the process of growing international activity in trade, finances, investments, technology, weapons, communications, ideas, values, and other areas.”⁴³ Kugler’s emphasis on globalization goes so far as to say that it is “the central driving reality of our times, one that creates a framework within which other powerful dynamics unfold.”⁴⁴

Secondly, U.S. grand strategy to be most effective should fully address all elements of national power operating within the global environment. The elements; diplomatic, informational, military and economic, must be viewed holistically as part of a global system. Each of these elements is most effective when used in full synchronization with the others to produce desired outcomes.

THE ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

It is clear that the tone of the current National Security Strategy, contrary to globalization theory, is heavily dependent on military power and weighted toward U.S. unilateral action to achieve strategic goals. It is equally clear that in the era of globalization the strength of nations cannot be measured exclusively by military capabilities. Henry Kissinger emphasized this point when commenting on the fall of the Soviet Union, “The fate of the Soviet Union demonstrated that one-sided emphasis on military power is impossible to sustain--especially in an age of economic and technological revolution linked by instant communications that bring the vast gaps in the standards of living into living rooms worldwide.”⁴⁵ Armed forces alone are not capable of defeating perverse ideologies that are deeply seated in a multitude of locations and embedded in the minds of thousands. Moreover, fielded forces are only marginally effective when used against a terrorist sub-culture that relies upon an underground economy supported by narco trafficking, well financed benefactors, and state sponsorship.

The U.S. preference for the use of military power is understandable. Military power is tangible, expedient and by its very nature nationalistic. The nation demanded that those responsible for the attacks of 9-11 be held accountable for their actions and operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al -Qaida were fully justified. Furthermore, and most importantly, the U.S. enjoyed overwhelming international support for its actions. However, U.S. actions in Afghanistan cannot be used as a template to fit other security challenges.

Instead, future U.S. grand strategy must emphasize a more balanced approach to the elements of national power. As Thomas Friedman warns, “If in the previous era of globalization nations in the system thought twice before trying to solve problems through warfare, in this era

of globalization they will think about it three times.⁴⁶ Furthermore, in the current era of globalization, actions in one region of the world may have broad effects in another region. As Henry Kissinger points out, "Globalization has diffused economic and technological power around the world. Instantaneous communications make the decisions in one region hostage to those in other parts of the globe."⁴⁷

Future strategies, therefore, should rely less on military muscle and more on the application the informational, diplomatic, and economic elements to be more fully effective and accepted in the global era. In support of a more balanced approach, Joseph S. Nye draws a practical and important distinction between the applications of "soft" vs. "hard" power. According to Nye, "soft power lies in the ability to attract and persuade rather than coerce."⁴⁸ Military force is unmistakably the most obvious expression of a nation's hard power and must remain a central part of U.S. security strategy. But, as Nye points out, "soft power will become increasingly important in dealing with the transnational issues that require multilateral cooperation for their solution."⁴⁹

U.S. grand strategy should therefore emphasize multilateral solutions to security challenges. This will require an increased emphasis, in both word and deed, on U.S. diplomatic efforts. Operating within the framework of the United Nations, North Atlantic Council, Organization of American States, and many other multilateral institutions must become an integral part of future strategies. Similarly, U.S. participation in economic organizations must be strengthened. The G8, World Trade Organization (WTO), and World Bank, among others, will assist struggling nations to develop. Those nations with weak governments and floundering economies are the breeding grounds for the terrorist networks that pose the greatest threat to U.S. security. Strong U.S. participation and leadership in multilateral organizations will promote U.S. values and diminish the threat by providing more freedom and opportunity to those otherwise oppressed. At a minimum, the U.S. will likely gain increased international support if it chooses to act militarily.

While always attempting to act multilaterally, U.S. security strategy must also recognize that frequent international consensus is unlikely. There will always be nations, most notably some of America's traditional European allies, that question the legitimacy of U.S. actions and therefore oppose the U.S. diplomatically. Robert Kagan, commenting on the complexity of legitimacy, states that in the current era "legitimacy is a genuinely elusive and malleable concept."⁵⁰ As an example of these differences, Kagan points out that WMD proliferation and international terrorism seem more threatening to Americans than to Europeans and, therefore,

many European nations are less likely to sanction U.S. actions.⁵¹ Even so, U.S. strategy must actively seek international legitimacy through diplomatic efforts.

The U.S. economy is perhaps America's greatest strength. Most nations and trade consortiums, e.g., the European Union, rely heavily on trade with the U.S. to ensure their own economic viability. Free trade and open markets are central to economic globalization and, because of the vibrant U.S. economy, favor U.S. security strategy. Therefore, the U.S. must use its economic power to promote western liberal ideals and values. In many places of the world, terrorism has become a way of life and the opportunity for a better standard of living is seemingly unachievable. U.S. leadership can reverse this trend by focusing economic policy in those areas that pose the greatest threat to U.S. interests. America's use of foreign aid, loans, and trade agreements should be used as leverage to get nations to act favorably toward U.S. policies. Diplomatically, the application of economic rewards and punishments add substance to what may otherwise be viewed as political rhetoric. For that reason, the economic element of power is inexorably linked to the diplomatic element.

The informational element of power has become an indispensable asset in the global era. Information technologies connect the world in near real time and are available to virtually anyone. According to Thomas Friedman, "It is now obvious that a country's power and status in the era of globalization is going to be a function, in part, of how much it is able and willing to develop the right software and operating systems needed to thrive."⁵² U.S. security strategy should strive to inform and reassure the world of America's values-based intentions, rather than flaunt its military strength. U.S. leadership can become increasingly potent through the proliferation of ideas and American values.

Preemption, the most controversial portion of the current National Security Strategy, must also continue to play a role in U.S. grand strategy, but should be used only when a threat to America or her allies is clear. Furthermore, broad international recognition of the threat is highly preferred. Nonetheless, the National Security Strategy should not antagonize the detractors of U.S. policy through overt statements calling for unilateral military action. Future strategies should heed Teddy Roosevelt's advice by "speaking softly and carrying a big stick."

Similarly, the doctrine of containment still has a place in U.S. security strategy. Certain nations, like North Korea and Iran, have resisted globalization and remain largely closed to the benefits of the modern age. Nations that sponsor terrorism and proliferate WMD technologies lack international support and are universally recognized as threats to global stability.

International actions, driven by U.S. leadership, can keep the danger from these rogue nations

contained and be a powerful source for change. In these cases, containment built upon diplomatic efforts is likely the best strategy.

CONCLUSION

The current strategic environment will likely last for decades, much in the same way as the Cold War. Therefore, the U.S. is much closer to the beginning of achieving its strategic vision than it is to the end. Ultimately, for the U.S. to prevail it must recognize the phenomenon of globalization and balance all the elements of national power, applying each with equal vigor.

WORD COUNT= 5745

ENDNOTES

¹ Paul Nitze served as head of Policy and Planning for the State Department from 1950–53 and was the principal author of NSC-68.

² Keir A. Lieber and Robert J. Lieber, "The Bush National Security Strategy." *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda*, December 2002; Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State; available from <<http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/1202/ijpe/pj7-4lieber.htm>>; Internet; accessed 4 February 2004.

³ Don M. Snider and John A. Nagl, "The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision," *The U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy*, (Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001), 128.

⁴ Lieber and Lieber.

⁵ This statement is not intended to minimize the significance of NSDD 75, which Norman A. Bailey accurately describes as the strategic plan that won the Cold War.

⁶ Snider and Nagl, 132-138.

⁷ George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 13.

⁸ David I. Grange, "Asymmetric Warfare: Old Method, New Concerns," *National Strategy Forum Review*, Winter 2000; available from <<http://www.nationalstrategy.com/nsr/v10n2Winter00/100202.htm>>; Internet; accessed 4 February 2004.

⁹ Richard N. Haass, Remarks to CIA Strategic Assessments Group Annual Conference: "The United States in the Third World Century," Wilmington, DE., November 14, 2001; available from <<http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/6423pf.htm>>; Internet; accessed 22 February 2004.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Kofi Annan, "The Walls have Come Down," International Herald Tribune, 4 October, 2002; available from <<http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/define/1004annan.htm>>; Internet; accessed 20 February 2004.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Joseph S. Nye, U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq," *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2003): 62.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Thomas Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), 9.

¹⁷ Condoleezza Rice, Remarks to the National Legal Center for the Public Interest, The Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York, 31 October 2003; available from <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/print/20031031-5.html>>; Internet; accessed 14 January 2004.

¹⁸ Bush, 5.

¹⁹ Ibid., 15.

²⁰ The tenets of the Bush doctrine are derived from several sources and the author's analysis of the National Security Strategy. Keir A. Lieber, Robert J. Lieber, Thomas Donnelly and others have identified and described these tenets in their analysis of the Bush strategy.

²¹ Ibid., 6.

²² Lieber and Lieber.

²³ John Lewis Gaddis, "A Grand Strategy of Transformation," *Foreign Policy* (November/December 2002): 50.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Dan Smith, "The National Security Strategy of the United States 2002," 12 April 2003; available from <http://www.fcnl.org/issues/mil/sup/national_security-strategy.htm>; Internet; accessed 30 January 2004.

²⁶ Barry R. Posen, "Command of the Commons; The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony," *International Security*, Summer 2003; available from <http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/Posen_summer_2003.pdf>; Internet; accessed 4 February 2004.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Charles Knight, "Essential Elements Missing in the National Security Strategy of 2002," Cambridge, MA. PDA Commentary adapted from a presentation at the Center for International Relations, Boston University, 9 October 2002; available from <<http://www.comw.org/qdr/0210knight.html>>; Internet; accessed 30 January 2004.

²⁹ Bush, 6.

³⁰ Christopher S. Owens, "Unlikely Partners: Preemption and the American Way of War," Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Contest 2003, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2003), 8.

³¹ Jeffrey Record, "The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq," *Parameters* (Spring 2003): 18.

³² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Pub 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 April 2001), 333.

³³ Ibid., 336.

³⁴ Record, 7.

³⁵ Bush, 6.

³⁶ Ibid., 29.

³⁷ Derived from remarks given by a subject matter expert presentation during the European Regional Strategic Appraisal Course at the U.S. Army War College on 25 February 2004.

³⁸ Bush, 6.

³⁹ Ibid., 31.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 1.

⁴¹ Fouad Ajami, "The Sentry's Solitude," *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2001): 16.

⁴² Richard L. Kugler, "A Distinctly American Internationalism for a Globalized World," *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda* (December 2002): 37.

⁴³ Ibid

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Henry A. Kissinger, *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 24.

⁴⁶ Friedman, 241.

⁴⁷ Kissinger, 24.

⁴⁸ Joseph S. Nye Jr., "U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq," *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2003): 66.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Robert Kagan, "America's Crisis of Legitimacy," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2004): 77.

⁵¹ Ibid., 80.

⁵² Friedman, 390.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ajami, Fouad. "The Sentry's Solitude." *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2001): 2-16.

Alden, Edward. "Globalisation Cited as Threat to US Security." *Financial Times*, 11 February, 2003. Available from <<http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/define/2003/0211security.htm>>. Internet. Accessed from the Global Policy Forum internet site on 20 February 2004.

Annan, Kofi. "The Walls Have to Come Down." *International Herald Tribune*, 4 October 2002. Available from <<http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/define/1004annan.htm>>. Internet. Accessed on 20 February 2004.

Bacevich, Andrew J. "Bush's Grand Strategy." *The American Conservative*, 4 November 2002. Available from <http://www.amconmag.com/2002_11_04/bushs_grand_strategy.html>. Internet. Accessed 16 January 2004.

Bailey, Norman A. *The Strategic Plan That Won the Cold War*. Mclean, VA.: The Potomac Foundation, 1999.

Bush, George W. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002.

David I. Grange. "Asymmetric Warfare: Old Method, New Concerns." *National Strategy Forum Review*, Winter 2000. Available from <<http://www.nationalstrategy.com/nsr/10n2Winter00/100202.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 4 February 2004.

Donnelly, Thomas. "The Underpinnings of the Bush Doctrine." *National Security Outlook*, AEI Online 1 February 2003. Available from <http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.15845/filter.foreign/pub_detail.asp>. Internet. Accessed 4 February 2004.

Friedman, Thomas. *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*. New York: Anchor Books, 2000.

_____. "Terrorism May Have Put Sand in its Gears but Globalization Won't Stop." Interview by Nayan Chanda. *Yale Global Online*, 30 January 2003. Available from <<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=870>>. Internet. Accessed 12 February 2004.

Gaddis John Lewis. "A Grand Strategy of Transformation," *Foreign Policy* (November/December 2002); 50-57.

Guoliang, Gu. "Redefine Cooperative Security, Not Preemption." *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2003. Available from <http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/twq/spr2003/twq_spr2003h.pdf>. Internet. Accessed 16 January 2004.

Haass, Richard N. "The Bush Administration's Response to Globalization." Remarks to the National Defense University, Washington D.C., 21 September 2001. Available from <<http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/5508pf.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 22 February 2004.

_____. "Policymakers and the Intelligence Community in This Global Era." Remarks to CIA Strategic Assessments Group Annual Conference, Wilmington, DE, 14 November 2001.

Available from <<http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/6423pf.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 22 February 2004.

Ikenberry, John G. "America's Imperial Ambition." *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 2002): 44-60.

_____. "American Grand Strategy in the Age of Terror." *Survival*, (Winter 2001): 19-43.

Kagan, Robert. "America's Legitimacy Crisis." *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2004): 65-87.

Kissinger, Henry A. *Does America Need a Foreign Policy? Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001.

Knight, Charles. Essential Elements Missing in the National Security Strategy of 2002. Cambridge, MA. PDA Commentary adapted from a presentation at the Center for International Relations, Boston University, 9 October 2002. Available from <<http://www.comw.org/qdr/0210knight.html>>. Internet. Accessed 30 January 2004.

Korb, Lawrence J. *A New National Security Strategy in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and Weapons of Mass Destruction*. Council on Foreign Relations, Brooking Institution Press, New York, 2003.

Kugler, Richard L. "A Distinctly American Internationalism for a Globalized World." *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda*, December 2002. Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State. Available from <<http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/pj7-4kugler.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 4 February 2004.

Lieber, Keir A. and Robert J. Leiber. "The Bush National Security Strategy." *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda*, December 2002. Electronic Journal of the U.S. Department of State. Available from <<http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/pj7-4lieber.htm>>. Internet. Accessed 4 February 2004.

Lobell, Steven J. *The Challenge of Hegemony*. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2003.

Nye, Joseph S., Jr. "U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq." *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2003): 60-73.

Owens, Christopher S. "Unlikely Partners: Preemption and the American Way of War." *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Contest*, Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2003: 1-15.

Pena, Charles V. "Bush's National Security Strategy is a Misnomer." *Policy Analysis*, no. 496, 30 October 2003, CATO Institute. Available from <<http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-496es.html>>. Internet. Accessed 30 January 2004.

Posen, Barry R. "Command of the Commons; The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony." *International Security*, Summer 2003. Available from <http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIA_content/documents/Posen_summer_2003.pdf>. Internet. Accessed 4 February 2004.

Posen, Barry R. and Andrew L. Ross. "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy." *International Security* (Winter 1996/97): 5-53.

Record, Jeffrey. "The Bush Doctrine and War with Iraq." *Parameters* (Spring 2003): 4-21.

Rice, Condoleezza. Remarks to the National Legal Center for the Public Interest. The Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York, 31 October 2003. Available from <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/print/20031031-5.html>>. Internet. Accessed 14 January 2004.

Smith, Dan. "The National Security Strategy of the United States 2002." 12 April 2003. Available from <http://www.fcnl.org/Issues/mil/sup/national_security-strategy.htm>. Internet. Accessed 30 January 2004.

Snider, Don M. and John A. Nagl. "The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision." *The U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy*. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. Joint Pub 1-02. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 April 2001.

University of Michigan Documents Center. "America's War against Terrorism, World Trade Center/Pentagon Terrorism and the Aftermath," Last updated on 2 October, 2003. Available from <<http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/usterror.html#wtc93>>. Accessed 16 October 2003.

Zelikow, Philip. "The Transformation of National Security – Five Redefinitions," *National Interest* (Spring 2003): 17-28.

